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Tina Piper* The Personal Information
Protection and Electronic
Documents Act A Lost
Opportunity to Democratize
Canada's 'Technological Society"1
Bill C-6, more recently known as the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, is promoted by the Canadian government as privacy
legislation to protect Canadians' personal information. This paper explores that
characterization and concludes that it is inaccurate and misleading. The prob-
lems that motivated a response by Parliament are the proliferation and commer-
cial importance of personal information, concerns Canadians have about its
uncontrolled use by the private sector and the inadequacy of existing law to
address those concerns. However, the Act has not responded to these problems.
There are several reasons for this, primarily the disproportionate and anti-
democratic importance of business interests in the promulgation of the legislation
and the characterization of privacy in market terms rather than in the language of
human rights and long-term policy objectives. The Act's failure to achieve its
substantive goals is demonstrated by comparing it with other models of privacy
protection, such as the Privacy Charter proposed by the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Human Rights, equivalent legislation in Quebec and the
Australian Privacy Charter. Ultimately, the paper proposes solutions that would
be more responsive to citizens' privacy concerns.
Le gouvernement du Canada affirme que le projet de loi C-6, mieux connu sous
le titre Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les documents
dlectroniques, a pour but de prot6ger la vie privee des Canadiens. Tout compte
fait, au dire de I'auteur, il s'agit d'une fausse representation. Le Parlement du
Canada a voulu reagir aux dangers que posent entre autres la prolif6ration des
renseignements personnels jumel6e a leur valeur commerciale croissante,
l'inqui6tude du citoyen quant i I'exploitation d6brid~e de cette information par le
secteur priv6 et enfin l'impuissance du cadre 16gislatif face i cette 6volution.
Cependant, le projet de loi C-6 n'apporte pas les solutions voulues au probl~me
et cela pour plusieurs raisons. Sans doute d'abord parce que les int6r~ts priv6s
qui pr6conisent haut et fort la promulgation de cette loi sont par nature anti-
d6mocratiques et ensuite parce que I'on asservit la notion de vie priv6e a des
imp6ratifs d'6conomie de march6 au lieu de I'envisager dans le contexte des
* L.L.B. Dalhousie Law School. Many thanks to Torys for funding to complete this paper
through the J.S.D. Tory Writing Award. Special thanks to Teresa Scassa whose instruction and
encouragement inspired this paper, and to David Piper, Audrey Macklin, Archie Kaiser and an
anonymous reviewer for their insightful suggestions and comments.
1. I have borrowed the concept of "The Technological Society" as developed by Jacques Ellul
in his influential book of the same name (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).
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droits de la personne et des objectifs d'une politique a Iong-terme. Pour se
convaincre que le projet de loi C-6 n'arrive pas i Ia cheville des objectifs auxquels
il pr6tend r6pondre, il suffit de le comparer a d'autres modules de protection de
la vie priv6e tels que la charte sur le respect de la vie priv6e propos6e par le
Comit6 permanent de la justice et des droits de la personne, de la Chambre des
Communes, la legislation 6quivalente au Quebec et enfin la charte sur le respect
de Ia vie priv6e de I'Australie. Nous proposons en d6finitive des solutions qui
r6pondraient mieux aux pr6occupations des citoyens canadiens.
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Introduction
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act2
is the federal government's most recent legislative effort to protect the
privacy of Canadians. It was inspired by the increased need for privacy
protection due to the proliferation and commercial importance of
Canadians' personal information. The Act was promulgated as a result of
the inadequacy of the current privacy regime in Canada to protect
personal information in the private sector. In this paper, I will highlight
the legal (particularly human rights) problems faced by the proliferation
of personal information, outline current Canadian legislation to protect
privacy and then discuss how the Act attempts to fill the gaps in privacy
protection.
I hope to demonstrate that the Act fails to achieve its declared goal of
protecting privacy. First, I will argue that the alignment of the interests of
government and the self-interest of business groups leads to legislation
that protects the short-term needs of business stakeholders instead of
long-term policy statements that promote the public good. Next, I
contend that the government justifies its narrow, market-focused goals by
constructing citizens as consumers with market needs instead of human
rights. I will then demonstrate, through a comparative analysis of the Act,
the Privacy Charter proposed by the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Human Rights and the Australian Privacy Charter, the
extent to which the Act fails to achieve its stated purpose of protecting
Canadians' right to privacy. I posit that the Act is made acceptable to
Canadians by the urgently felt need to address the issues created by the
inevitable and relentless evolution of technology. Finally, I propose
solutions that may improve the protection of privacy in Canada.
2. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [passed as
the Act, assented to April 13, 2000, hereinafter the "Act"].
256 The Dalhousie Law Journal
I. The Collection of Personal Information in Canada
1. How Personal Information is Collected
Personal information is collected by both the public and private sector. In
particular, the government collects information from answers supplied
by citizens in order to receive government services. These may include
government grants (Human Resources Development Canada) or
Employment Insurance,3 censuses (through StatsCan4), through the
enforcement of the law, 5 property assessments, customs declarations and
information provided to Revenue Canada in tax returns6 or to Elections
Canada by voting lists.'
The primary private sector collectors of personal information are
banking institutions, insurance and credit card companies, private-sector
health care providers like pharmacies, telecommunications and cable
companies, chartered accountants, and corporations involved in direct
marketing! The private sector also acquires personal information through
an array of media, including surveys, the exchange of personal information
for free services or products,9 billing records, customer and subscriber
3. For example, the federal government has cross-matched information provided to Human
Resources Development Canada and Revenue Canada to determine how many of those people
who obtained grants from HRDC continue to remain self-supporting. House of Commons
Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, "Privacy:
Where Do We Draw the Line", online: The Canadian Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
committees352/huso/reports/03 1997-04/cove.html> (date accessed: 10 May 2001) [hereinafter
"Standing Committee"].
On May 29, 2000 the federal government announced that, in response to concerns voiced by
the Privacy Commissioner and citizens, it was dismantling the Human Resources Development
database on Canadian citizens, online: Human Resources Development Canada <http://
www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/common/news/dept/00-39.shtml> (last modified: 15 March 2001).
4. For more information see online: StatsCan <http://www.statcan.ca/english/services/> (last
modified: I May 2001).
5. "Privacy: The protection of personal information", online: Strategis <http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/
english/privacy/632d 1 3.html> (last modified: 12 December 2000).
6. For example, online: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency <http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/
eservices/strategy/> (date accessed: 10 May 2001).
7. For more information see online: < http://www.elections.ca/home.asp?textonly=false>
(last modified: 6 April 2001).
8. Information obtained generally from: V. Steeves, "We Need More Protection From
Invasion of Privacy", online: Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of
Ottawa <http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/techno/citizen.html> (date accessed: 12 May 2001);
supra note 5; "What is privacy?", online: Strategis <http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/englishlprivacy/
632d4.html> (last modified: 10 December 2001).
9. M. Stroh, "Privacy and the Net: Where is it heading? Web sites can follow a trail with your
data, recording every move" The Ottawa Citizen (3 January 2000), online: Human Rights
Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa <http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/technol
techno.html> (last modified: 4 December 1997).
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mailing lists and through exchanging or buying compiled information. ' 0
On the Internet, information is commonly obtained through tracking
individuals' activities on-line using "cookies" '"I or by collecting "click-
stream data"'2 of pages visited and downloaded.
2. What Type of Personal Information is Sought?
Personal information is collected from Canadians as they engage in all
aspects of civic and consumer life. At the most basic level the type of data
sought is demographic, such as name, address, e-mail address, age,
marital status, sex and social insurance number. This basic information
is then supplemented by information particular to the projected end-use
of the information sought.'3
The attitudes, opinions and beliefs of individuals are valuable personal
information, as are the contents of personal phone, fax and e-mail
communications.' 4 Medical information, in particular on drugs prescribed,
allergies and medical treatment received, is collected. Also biological
and biometric data is compiled such as genetic information, finger scans,
fingerprints, hand geometry and retinal scans.'5
Geographical information may be sought such as place of residence
(including type of residence and neighbourhood), location at any given
time, times of entry and exit into particular structures or facilities (e.g.
subways, parking lots or toll highways). 6 Law enforcement information
may be collected which includes criminal records, warrants or civil
judgments. Financial information may be gathered such as debt or credit
information, loans, repayments, savings, withdrawals, deposits and use
10. H.J. Smith, Managing Privacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994)
[hereinafter "Managing Privacy"].
II. Cookies are text files stored on a user's hard-drive with an identification number and other
information which allows Web operators to easily identify a particular user on-line (supra note
9). Information is also collected on-line through newsgroups, e-mail and chat sessions (J.
Rothchild, "Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspaice Utopianism" (1999)
74 Ind. L.J. 893).
12. 1998-1999 Annual Report of the Privacy Commissioner, online: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/ar/02 04_07.e.asp> (date accessed: 13 May 2001)
[hereinafter "1999 Annual Report"].
13. There is unlimited scope for the collection of personal information and I do not intend to
provide a comprehensive survey of all personal information collected.
14. G. Walters, "Digitizing Technology, Transforming Ourselves" (1999) 10 N.J.C.L. 373
at 379 [hereinafter "Transforming Ourselves"].
15. Ibid.
16. Transforming Ourselves, supra note 14 at 375. See also S. Garfinkel, "Privacy and the
New Technology: What They Do Know Can Hurt You", online: The Nation <http://
past.thenation.com/cgi-bin/framizer.cgi?url=http://past.thenation.com/issue/00228/
0228garfinkel.shtml> (date accessed: 13 May 2001).
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of particular services. 7 Most popular is the compilation of consumer
information, such as the amount and type of good purchased, frequency
of purchases, patterns of purchases and use made of consumer products.'8
3. The Purposes of Collecting Personal Information
Personal information can be collected for the sole purpose of ensuring
that the information is available if needed (this is referred to as data
warehousing). However, personal information can also be compiled,
manipulated and transformed through combining information within the
collecting organization or by merging information from separate
collections and organizations. The consolidation of data has been facilitated
by the increased computerization of information and has been encouraged
through technologies such as relational computer software (for grouping
and cross-referencing data), sophisticated linear searching programs 9
and Artificial Intelligence (AI)2 ° that make the processing of information
cheap and convenient.2' Raw or compiled data can then be resold for
profit.22 The two major end-uses for personal information are targeted
marketing and the minimization of risk.
Targeted marketing uses data compiled as demographic or
psychographic profiles.2 3 These profiles (which can identify both consumer
preferences and where to find those consumers24 ) are then used to directly
17. I. Lawson, Privacy and Free Enterprise (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1992)
at 17 [hereinafter "Free Enterprise"].
18. 1995-1996 Annual Report of the Privacy Commissioner, online: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/ar/02_04_04_e.asp> (date accessed: 13 May2001).
19. Managing Privacy, supra note 10 at 7.
20. Artificial intelligence, in particular, can be used to scan databases and detect patterns and
relationships between data contained within the database (D. Banisar, "Big Brother Goes High-
Tech", online: Media Awareness Network <http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/priv/
resource/brother.html> (date accessed: 13 May 2001)).
2 1. Free Enterprise, supra note 1 7 at 4.
22. Supra note 9. See also online: Undercurrents <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/undercurrents/>
(date accessed: 13 May 2001).
23. A psychographic profile attempts to classify individuals into groups according to their
attitudes, interests and opinions as opposed to strict demographic criteria like age, residence
and occupation. To achieve this cataloguing, psychographics asks normal and then obscure
questions such as: Could you skin a dead animal? Would you vote for a communist to be mayor
of your city? The primary distinction between demographic and psychographic profiles is that
demographic profiles are based on facts (such as age, sex, occupation) whereas psychographic
profiles are based on feelings. For example, if women of an identical demographic buy different
types of cars then this difference is explained by psychographics (Managing Privacy, supra
note 10 at 77).
24. The Privacy Commissioner outlined in his most recent report the useful marketing finding
that men who go to buy diapers in the evening usually buy beer on their way home (1999 Annual
Report, supra note 12).
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target individuals, in contrast to traditional marketing methods which
indiscriminately advertise to a general public.2 1
The second major use of personal information entails exchanging and
matching information between organizations to minimize institutional
risk. Banks and credit granting institutions use personal information
(about income and credit rating, for example) to gauge the level of lending
risk that a prospective client presents. Insurance companies use compiled
personal information (about health or lifestyle, for example) to make
decisions about whether or at what rate to insure an individual .26 Personal
information may also be used in decisions about whom to hire.27
4. Concerns Over the Collection of Personal Information
The collection, compilation and exchange of information have raised
concerns among those whose information is collected. First, citizens are
concerned that their information is being used for purposes other than
those for which it was collected.28 Second, there are worries that the
public and private sectors are collecting more information than is required,
often under false pretenses, without obtaining meaningful consent. 29
25. Managing Privacy, supra note 10 at 8. Common examples of targeted micromarketing are
the use of credit card purchase records to directly target promotional offers for such things as
travel, recreation and automobile purchases or the creation of purchasing circles and or
recommended purchasing lists by bookstores (i.e. Amazon.com) (supra note 9). Further
examples are outlined in Senate, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
Evidence, issue 2 (29 Nov. 1999), submissions of Phillipa Lawson at 10 [hereinafter "Issue 2"],
where she states:
[a] Montreal woman [had] been diagnosed with cancer. No sooner did she get home
from the hospital than she received a telephone solicitation from a funeral home. New
mothers who give birth at hospitals are frequently inundated with the marketing of baby
products. While this may seem harmless, it is not appreciated when the baby has died.
In one reported case, a man who had consulted a medical clinic for sexual dysfunction
later received direct mail advertising cures for impotence.
26. V. Steeves, "A Better Road Map for the Information Highway: Critical Human Rights
Issues in the Access and Privacy Field", online: Human Rights Research Centre, University of
Ottawa <http://www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/publicat/mbs.html> (date accessed: 13 May 2001)
[hereinafter "Road Map"].
27. See also Issue 2, supra note 25: "A recent survey of Fortune 500 companies indicated that
over half admitted to using medical information in employment decisions, often without the
individual's knowledge or consent."
28. A recent example is the matching of returning traveler's customs declarations with their
employment insurance claims to detect potential abuse of El (1999 Annual report, supra note 12).
29. In the public sector, 20% of the Canadian population every five years is required to fill
out the long form census which requires such information as the mortgage payments, brands
of products used and religion (supra note 22). In the private sector, marketing surveys are
frequently disguised as contests or games. For example, U.S. car dealerships often have a
computer where a potential car buyer enters information to help the computer match a car to
their personality type. A car is then recommended to the customer while a second result is then
printed in the dealership's offices recommending the type of sales strategy to use on the
customer such as "hard-sell" or "friendly sell". (Managing Privacy, supra note 10 at 99).
260 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Thirdly, there is no mechanism for ensuring that personal information is
eventually deleted3° and there are few means to establish what information
actually exists about oneself." Citizens are also concerned that their
personal information is being shared with people whose access was not
contemplated in their original consent. 2
Further, data collectors may be coercing citizens by tying personal
information to access to services or even to threats of prosecution. 31
Personal data that is erroneous can proliferate (through matching and
exchanging of databases) and can result in the denial of services,
particularly if no means exist to correct the data.34 Additionally, if
information is combined then its sum may be more than its parts and can
resultin ahighly accurate and detailed profile of an individual consumer.35
Finally, access by decision makers to large pools of personal data may
reduce individual judgment capability and result in a quantitative and
formulaic process decision making process.3
6
30 Supra note 8 at 4.
31 Supra note 5 at 4.
32 This concern is particularly pronounced regarding the use of information collected by
government that is then sold for marketing purposes (supra note 8). Another example, outlined
by the Privacy Commissioner, is that anytime a transaction is completed using an Air Miles
card, information about that transaction is packaged and shared with 134 corporate sponsors
of Air Miles (1999 Annual Report, supra note 12).
33 For example, failing to complete a federal government census may result in a fine or
imprisonment (supra note 22). As well, employees may be required to undergo a genetic or
drug test to ensure they get or keep a job (Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 6).
34 An example is an incorrect credit history which is then used to deny a bank loan. (Managing
Privacy, supra note 10 at 116-117).
35 For example, in an anonymous study, Bank A admitted to buying anonymous data from an
outside vendor. Bank A would exchange information such as names and addresses and in return
receive the following information directly correlated to those names and addresses:
1. Purchasing Power Data: the individual's purchasing power, use of credit accounts and
the type of credit, the degree to which the individual is willing to commit to fixed payment
obligations and estimated household income.
2. Purchasing Activity Data: A measure of a person's propensity to use bank cards, travel
cards, retail cards, oil and auto cards and their total number of active credit accounts.
3. Consumer Shopping Data: the consumer categorized by shopping preferences (cash
shopper, prestige shopper, value shopper, price shopper, etc.).
4. Demographic Data: date of birth, marital status, gender and classification into one of
sixty-four market segments based on financial and geodemographic data.
Managing Privacy, ibid. at 114.
36. An example of this concern includes the large number of credit cards issued annually to
animals or the deceased (Managing Privacy, ibid. at 122).
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II. The Underlying Privacy Protection Framework
The apprehension among citizens about the collection of personal infor-
mation is manifested in increased concern about violations of personal
privacy which has been demonstrated in surveys and opinion polls,37
complaints to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 8 and other
initiatives such as websites, group action, seminars, studies and work-
shops.39 The criticism focuses on the perceived inadequacies of the
legislative and common law protection of privacy.
37. The results of some of these surveys are outlined below:
Public surveys of Canadians have consistently revealed a remarkably high level of
concern over the issue of privacy. The 1992 Canadian Privacy Survey by Ekos Research
Associates Inc. found that 92 percent of the 3 000 Canadians interviewed believed
privacy to be an important issue, and that 60 percent believed they have less personal
privacy now than a decade ago... A 1994 Gallup Canada survey for Andersen
Consulting revealed that over 80 percent of the Canadians polled expressed concern
about the personal information about them that might be collected by companies
through the information highway. These studies suggest a pervasive belief that personal
privacy is under siege from a range of technological, commercial and social threats and
that something must be done about it. [emphasis added]
Communications Development and Planning Branch Spectrum, Industry Canada,
"Privacy and the Canadian Information Highway, Building Canada's Information and
Communications Infrastructure", online: Strategis <http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/english/
privacy> (date accessed: 27 March 2000).
More recently (in 1998) a study by Ekos found that "94 per cent of Canadians believe it
is increasingly important to have safeguards for personal information on the Internet.
Canadians, moreover, are becoming much more knowledgeable about privacy issues."
(Senate, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Evidence, issue 5 (2
Dec. 1999).)
38. As the Privacy Commissioner documents in his 1998-1999 report: "Incoming complaints
jumped past the 3000 mark for the first time in the office's history-new complaints reached
3105 for the 1998-99 fiscal year." (1999 Annual Report, supra note 12)
39. A study conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights
concludes that:
[W]e could not but be amazed by the degree of consensus that emerged in each of our
meetings... they [citizens] all believe that privacy matters [emphasis added].
Standing Committee, supra note 3.
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1. The Legal Protection of Privacy in Canada
Canada is committed internationally to the protection of privacy gener-
ally by art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
provides that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.4 °
Article 12, however, has not been directly implemented in Canadian
law. The European Union enacted the Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Dataa" in 1995 to harmonize data protection
within the European Union. It compels European states to enact legislation
to protect personal information in their public and private sectors. It also
requires that states wishing to exchange information with European
Union member nations have an "adequate level of protection", otherwise
those transfers will be blocked. Although the Directive does not protect
data collected from Canadians in Canada, it has motivated Canadian
legislators to enact legislation to protect data, as inadequate Canadian
data protection laws could be a significant non-tariff trade barrier
between Canada and the European Union.42
Domestically, the highest legal authority for a right of privacy is the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms43 which, while not explicitly
providing protection of privacy, has been interpreted to protect dignity,
40. A provision similar to art. 12 is contained in art. 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 2, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976).
41. Official Journal of the European Community November 23, 1995, no. L281 at 31.
42. Supra note 8.
43. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 263
A Lost Opportunity to Democratize Canada's "Technological Society"
autonomy and privacy in sections 7, 44 8 4 5 and 2(b).46 In particular, s. 8 of
the Charter has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada to
address violations of privacy caused by electronic surveillance and the
use of personal information stored on databases. 47 However, the Charter
is an inherently limited means for protecting privacy as it directly applies
only to activities involving a government actor (not the private sector) and
infringements can be justified under section 1 as reasonable limitations
in a free and democratic society.
44. Section 7 provides that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice." This provision implements art. 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
provides: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person."
Section 7 liberty interests have been held to encompass not only physical liberty, but also
fundamental concepts of human dignity, individual autonomy and privacy (R. v. Morgentaler
[ 1988] 1 S.C.R. 30) and R. v. Jones (11986] 2 S.C.R. 284)). In B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society
of Metropolitan Toronto [ 199511 S.C.R. 315 the court did not contest the notion that s. 7 rights
relate not only to physical constraints on liberty, but may extend to a sphere of personal
autonomy that the state is precluded from invading. Finally the autonomy interest of choosing
where one lives is protected by s. 7 (Godbout c. Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844).
See generally: A.W. MacKay, "The Waves of Information Technology, the Ebbing of
Privacy, and the Threat to Human Rights" (1999) 10 N.J.C.L. 411. [hereinafter "Ebbing"]
45. Section 8 provides that: "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure."
Section 8 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada as applying outside of the
criminal context (R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128) and is a personal right (R. v. Plant, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 281) that protects an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy (Hunter v.
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145). The expectation of privacy can depend on: one's status
(there is a lower expectation of privacy if one is in police custody (R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 607)), one's social class (a student has a lower expectation of privacy than others (R.
v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393)), and the location of the privacy violation (for example, there
is a lower expectation of privacy in a school (R. v. M.(M.R.)).
46. Section 2(b) holds that:
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:...
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication.
In R. v. Sharpe, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1555 the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that s.
163.1(4), which prohibits the possession of child pornography in a wide array of circumstances,
violated the defendant's s. 2(b) rights to freedom of expression as it impinged on the value of
liberty, autonomy and privacy protected by the Charter. See also R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697 which upheld the constitutionality of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code as it
specifically excluded private conversations, thus protecting individual privacy (Ebbing, supra
note 44).
47. The court has been reluctant to extend s. 8 protection to personal information stored in
databases (R. v. Plant, supra note 45), but has interpreted s. 8 to protect against electronic
surveillance in the criminal context (R. v. Duarte, [199011 S.C.R. 30 and R. v. Wong, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 36). The level of constitutional protection afforded personal information may be
limited by the relaxed application of s. 8 to administrative law (R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd.,
[19901 1 S.C.R. 627).
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In Quebec, art. 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms4" protects the right to privacy by guaranteeing every person the
right to respect for his or her private life and providing for a right to
compensation if that right is infringed. This document enjoys quasi-
constitutional status as it prevails over all other enactments in the
province unless there is express wording to the contrary.49
Both federal and provincial governments have enacted legislation to
protect the collection and exchange of personal information in the public
sector. The federal government enacted the Privacy Act in 1982 as a
means of controlling the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information about federal government employees and those who use its
services. It applies to all federal government institutions." The legislation
also established the Office of the Privacy Commissioner whose role is to
monitor and resolve disputes under the Privacy Act. Most provinces have
enacted similar legislation that applies to their provincial public sectors.1
However, no province other than Quebec has legislation governing the
use and exchange of personal information by the private sector. The
Quebec legislation, An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal
Information in the Private Sector,52 is discussed below in s. 6.
The common law has begun to recognize a tort of invasion of privacy53
and four provinces, British Columbia,54 Manitoba,55 Saskatchewan 56
and Newfoundland, have enacted legislation that creates tortious liability
48. R.S.Q.,c.C-12.
49. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 17.
50. "All federal departments, most federal agencies and some federal Crown corporations"
comprise "federal institutions." The information protected by the Privacy Act includes name,
address, race, age, ethnicity, financial status, employment history, criminal records, medical
history and personal views. Specific categories of personal information held by government
are more fully protected by the Income Tax Act and the Statistics Act (D.C. Kratchanov,
Personal Information and the Protection of Privacy, Appendix M to the Proceedings of the
1995 Meeting of The Uniform Law Conference of Canada, online: Uniform Law Conference
of Canada <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/95pro/e95m.htm> (date accessed: 13 May
2001) [hereinafter "ULCC"]).
51. The provinces that have enacted legislation are Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia, Alberta, Nova Scotia and the Yukon.
52. R.S.Q., c. P-39.1 [hereinafter the "Quebec Act"].
53. For more information see A.M Linden & L.N. Kar, Canadian Tort Law (Markham:
Butterworths, 1994) at 93. The common law protection of privacy may also include the tort of
appropriation of personality (Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 15 (Ont.
C.A.)).
54. Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373.
55. Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-125.
56. Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24.
57. Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-22.
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for the invasion of privacy. However, these provisions have not been the
subject of intensive judicial consideration and have not acted as a potent
means for protecting privacy.58
Thus, while some legally enforceable protection of privacy and
personal information exists in Canada it is either limited to the public
sector, contained within voluntary private sector or professional codes or
relies on individual enforcement through civil actions. Except in Quebec,
there is no constitutional or legislative commitment to protect a broad
right of privacy.
2. Initiatives to Protect Privacy
Solutions have been proposed to remedy the inadequacies caused by
limited legal protection of privacy and personal information in Canada,
particularly with regard to the private sector. Two are worthy of mention.
First, the Standing Committee on Human Rights has proposed a Canadian
Charter of Privacy Rights (Privacy Charter) to declare and entrench
rights to privacy.5 9 (See Appendix A.) This charter may even be enacted
into law if it is passed by the Legislature.' The Privacy Charter is closely
modeled after the Australian Privacy Charter, a non-binding policy
document developed by the Australian Privacy Charter Council.6 (See
Appendix B.) It has also been suggested that a right to privacy be included
58. ULCC, supra note 50.
59. The Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Human Rights and the Status of
Persons with Disabilities spent 10 months exploring privacy fights and the new technologies.
The research process involved discussions with a wide cross-section of citizens across
Canadian constituencies in a townhall discussion format. The Committee of Members of
Parliament wrote a final report recommending the government enact a Privacy Charter.
V. Steeves, "A Response to Professor Walter's Article, 'Digitizing Technology, Transforming
Ourselves"' (1999) 10 N.J.C.L. 445 at 451. [hereinafter "Response"]
60. Bill S-27: An Act to guarantee the human right of privacy was introduced by Senator
Sheila Finestone and passed first reading on June 15, 2000. It was then re-introduced and passed
first reading on March 13, 2001 as Bill S-21 and was sent to the Social Affairs, Science and
Technology Committee on April 26, 2001, online: The Canadian Parliament <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/prog-e.htm> (date accessed: 6 May 2001).
61. The Australian Privacy Charter was developed in 1992 by a group of 25 invited members
and has received significant attention in Australia and abroad. The aim of the principles is to
act
as a general statement of the privacy protection that Australians should expect to see
observed by both the public and private sectors. They are intended to act as a benchmark
against which the practices of business and government, and the adequacy of legislation
and codes, may be measured. They inform Australians of the privacy rights they are
entitled to expect and should observe.
For more information see: Australian Privacy Charter Council <http://www.anu.edu.au/
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PrivChHist.html> (date accessed: 13 May 2001).
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in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.62 The advantages and
disadvantages of each option will be discussed in the Recommendations
(section V).
I1. The Act: The Government's Answer to Concerns about
the Collection of Personal Information63
The federal government's response to Canadians' concerns about the
security and privacy of their personal information was to pass the Act. 64
Responsibility for its creation lay with Industry Canada.65
Briefly, the Act applies to personal information 66 collected, used or
disclosed by the federally regulated private sector (e.g. interprovincial
transportation, banking, telecommunications and broadcasting) and by
federal government entities not covered by the federal Privacy Act.67 It
also applies to information that is exchanged or transferred inter-
provincially and internationally. After three years, the Act will apply to
62. Supra note 5 at 5. Recommendation by the B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy
Association, Canada's Coalition for Public Information, Privacy Partners, and the Public
Interest Advocacy Centre. For more support see D. Gutstein, E.con: How the Internet
Undermines Democracy (Toronto: Stoddart, 1999) at 285 [hereinafter "E.con"I and the
Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 17. Note as well that the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada has proposed a Uniform Electronic Commerce Act. However, this proposed Act
addresses the legal issues of electronic commerce (contract formation and technicalities of the
sale of goods) rather than substantive issues of privacy (ULCC, supra note 50).
63. For the purposes of this paper I will only be discussing Part I of the Act. Part II legislates
with respect to electronic documents and is regarded by many as a separate piece of legislation
even though it has been enacted as part of the Act (Standing Senate Committee on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology, Issue 4 -Evidence, Ottawa, Monday, December 1, 1999).
64. Supra note 2. In the words of Industry Canada: "The purpose of the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act is to provide Canadians with a right of privacy with
respect to their personal information that is collected used or disclosed by an organization in the
private sector .... [emphasis added] ("Backgrounder Privacy Provisions Highlights", online:
Strategis <http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/english/fastfacts/43d8.html> (date accessed: 13 May 2001).
65. The longer title of the Act states that it is:
An Act to support and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal information
that is collected, used or disclosed in certain circumstances, by providing for the use of
electronic means to communicate or record information or transactions and by amending
the Canada Evidence Act, the Statutory Instruments Act and the Statute Revision Act
[emphasis added]. (Supra note 2.)
66. Personal information is defined in s. 2 as "information about an identifiable individual,
but does not include the name, title or business address or telephone number of an employee
of an organization." Ibid.
67. Ibid., s. 4(2).
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personal information collected, used, or disclosed by both the federal and
provincial public sector and the private sector.68
The Act enacts substantive privacy provisions as Schedule I. How-
ever, these provisions are only recommendations and are not legally
binding obligations. 69 Schedule I is based on the Canadian Standards
Association's Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information.70
It attempts to address some of the concerns I outlined in Section 1,4.
Principle 4.2 requires that the purpose for which data are used be
identified by the organization and that the organization be prepared to
explain this purpose to individuals. As well, knowledge and consent are
required for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information7
and organizations are advised to be open about their data management
policies.72
Principle 4.4 confronts problems of over-collection of data by requiring
that collection of information be limited to information necessary to
fulfill the purposes identified in Principle 4.2. Additionally, the Schedule
stipulates that information cannot be obtained through deception. 73
The purpose of Principle 5 is to allay concerns about indefinite
retention of personal information; it requires that information be retained
only for as long as it is required and then it should be destroyed, erased
or made anonymous.7 4
By requiring that consent be given to the use of personal information
for new purposes, the Act addresses fears that personal information might
be disseminated without the knowledge of the individual.75 Organizations
are also required to protect data (based on its level of sensitivity) from
loss, theft or unauthorized modification. 76 This principle attempts to
control who has access to personal information. The Schedule recommends
that individuals should be given access to their personal information 77
and organizations must be open to the public about their policies and
68. Ibid., s. 30. Note that the Act does not apply to individuals who collect information for
personal or domestic use (s. 4(2)(b)) and does not apply to organizations collecting information
forjournalistic, artistic or literary purposes (s. 4(2)(c)). Provinces can remove themselves from
the application of the Act by enacting legislation that is substantively similar to the Act's
provisions.
69. Ibid., s. 5(2).
70. Supra note 64.
71. Supra note 2, Sch. I, principle 4.3.
72. Ibid., principle 4.8.
73. Ibid., principle 4.3.5.
74. Ibid., principle 4.5.3.
75. Ibid., principle 4.2.4.
76. Ibid., principle 4.7.
77. Ibid., principle 4.9.
78. Ibid., principle 4.8.
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practices regarding the management of personal information.78 These
provisions aid in determining what information actually exists about
oneself and limiting its use.
The correctness of data is dealt with by Principle 4.6, which requires
that personal information be "accurate, complete and up-to-date." The
Schedule recommends that the organization correct information if an
individual demonstrates that it is incorrect. 79
The web of responsibility is widened by the recommendation that
organizations are accountable for personal information in their control or
transmitted to third parties.8" Enforcement of the principles is also
encouraged by Principle 4.10 which recommends that individuals be
allowed to challenge an organization's compliance with the
recommendations of the Schedule.
The Act does not address the concern that the provision of goods and
services may be tied to divulging personal information. Nor are there any
general statements of policy in the Act restricting the creation of highly
detailed individual profiles or discouraging mechanical decision making
based on database information.
Enforcement of the provisions of the Act lies with the federal Privacy
Commissioner, who can investigate complaints, report on those complaints
and attempt to resolve disputes.81 The Commissioner can also
independently initiate audits.82 Should a claim remain unresolved, a
complainant or the Commissioner can apply to the Federal Court for a
hearing where the court can order an organization to "correct its practices"
and publish notice of any action taken to correct its practices; the court can
also order damages (including punitive damages).83 The Commissioner
is generally responsible for developing information programs "to foster
public understanding, and recognition of the purposes" of the Act and for
undertaking and publishing research about the protection of personal
information. The Commissioner must also encourage organizations to
develop policies and practices that comply with the principles of the
Schedule.8 4
An evaluation of the substantive provisions of the Act as well as its
omissions will follow in the subsequent sections of this paper. The
analysis will highlight both the weakness of the substantive provisions
79. Ibid., principle 4.9.5.
80. Ibid., principle 4.1.
81. Ibid., see Division 2, "Remedies."
82. Ibid., Division 3, "Audits."
83. Ibid., ss. 14-16.
84. Ibid., s. 24.
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and the significance of the omissions and tie those to larger trends in
governance, citizenship and consumerism.
IV. The Act: Responsive to the Interests of the Business Community
Regardless of the assertions of the federal government,85 the Act was not
passed as substantive privacy protection legislation. Instead its purpose
is to facilitate e-commerce by reassuring Canadians that their personal
information may be protected. This will be demonstrated by outlining
first, the growing convergence of business and government decision-
making and the subsequent construction of the Canadian citizen as the
Canadian consumer. It will then be shown that the "consumerization of
citizenship" and the fragmentation of social interaction through the
commodification of information have resulted in short-sighted legislative
efforts (i.e. the Act) to protect data not human rights. Finally, I will
demonstrate how the Act is made more palatable to Canadians through
the spread of doctrines of technological determinism and inevitability.
1. The Close Relationship Between Business and Government
A close relationship between business and government may result in
corporate-style governance. Legitimate democratic governance requires
the exercise of power by individual citizens. Corporatism, however,
relies on the exercise of power primarily by groups.86 These groups can
be corporations, but also include other entities such as consumer
organizations, think tanks or lobbying associations. Corporatism functions
within the structures of democracy. However, its ends are fundamentally
undemocratic.
True democracy achieves legitimacy by substantiating its citizens'
rights through acting in the public good since "[g]overnment is the only
85. See the comments of Industry Canada, supra note 64.
86. J.R. Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (Concord, Ont.: House of Anansi Press, 1995) at 62.
87. Ibid. at 29.
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organized mechanism that makes possible that level of shared disinterest
known as the public good."87 Corporatism, on the other hand, promotes
the self-interest of groups over the public good; 88 the role of self-interest
is masked by referring to citizens as public interest groups.8 9 Decisions
in a corporatist society are made by the groups that are its constituency
in the form of group negotiations, 'multistakeholder' or consensual
alliances.90
Citizens are "represented" and can "participate" in the decision mak-
ing process through consumer or public interest groups. Through direct
consultations, the citizen's voice can be 'heard' as a factor to consider in
the decision making process. However, this voice is ignored as the
important decisions have already been made elsewhere9' by government
and business interest groups in informal private governments92 that
88. Ibid. at 76. Ursula Franklin has discussed the shift of government from fulfilling the
interests of the public good (referred to as indivisible benefits) to satisfying self-interest
(named as divisible benefits) in the specific context of technological development in Canada.
Divisible benefits accrue when five people, for example, plant tomatoes and then those same
five people share those tomatoes once they have grown. Indivisible benefits, however, accrue
to those who may not have made sacrifices. For example, if one actively campaigns to reduce
pollution then benefits accrue to both yourself and your neighbours who did nothing. As she
states:
Technology has changed this notion about the obligations of a government to its citizens
[to provide indivisible benefits]. The public infrastructures that made the development
and spread of technology possible have become more and more frequently roads to
divisible benefits. Thus the public purse has provided the wherewithal from which the
private sector derives the divisible benefits, while at the same time the realm from which
the indivisible benefits are derived has deteriorated and often remains unprotected.
U. Franklin, The Real World of Technology (Concord, Ont.: House of Anansi Press, 1999) at 66.
89. An example of this is provided by Industry Canada when commenting on the CSA
Standard: "First, it represents a consensus among key stakeholders from the private sector,
consumer and other public interest organizations, and some government bodies." [emphasis
added] (Industry Canada, "Privacy: The protection of personal information", online: Strategis
<http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/english/privacy/632d5.html> (date accessed: 13 May 2001)).
90. Supra note 86.
91. As Saul states:
Not surprisingly, both the referendum and direct democracy are a happy marriage with
corporatism. The complex, real questions are dealt with behind the scenes through
efficient "interest mediation" between the different interest groups. As for the citizenry,
they are occupied and distracted by the fireworks of their direct involvement on the big
questions and their direct relationship with the big people.
Ibid. at 109.
92. Econ, supra note 62 at 75. These informal private governments are composed of "federal
and provincial government agencies, corporate pressure groups, major corporations, members
of the media, (rarely) public-interest pressure groups, and other who attempted over a long
period of time to influence policy in a particular field."
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produce an elite consensus. 93 Therefore, instead of attempting to fulfill its
commitment to the public good, government seeks to balance the inter-
ests of citizens with the democratically irrelevant needs of non-citizens
(corporations).
The use of negotiation, consensus and direct consultation portray
corporatist governance as more populist and representative than legitimate
democracy. 94 Comments by Professor Errol Mendes, Director of the
93. A strong current of academic thought holds that the corporate/governing elite in a country
is more closely allied with the governing elite of other countries and transnational corporations,
than with the citizens they represent. (R. Babe, Communication and the Transformation of
Economics: Essays in Information, Public Policy, and Political Economy (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995) at 207 [hereinafter "Babe"]) See also: M. Dobbin, The Myth of the Good Corporate
Citizen: Democracy Under the Rule of Big Business (Toronto: Stoddart, 1998) at 5.
An example of the close identification with international interests is provided in an Industry
Canada document: "[The Act] should include a blend of voluntary and regulatory approaches
and, given the global reach of electronic commerce, should be consistent with approaches to
consumer protection agreed to by the international community." (Industry Canada, "Principles
of Consumer Protection for Electronic Commerce", online: Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
SSG/ca0l 185e.html> (publication date: 8 November 1999)).
As well, the Canadian government has placed much of its decision-making on foreign policy
in the hands of "Team Canada."
As Robert Babe comments:
The idea that "Team Canada" is forming policies, such as free trade and information
highway initiatives, makes a lot of sense once it is realized.., that the beneficiaries of
such initiatives are predominantly "Team Canada's" transnational corporate members.
Babe, ibid. at 203.
Finally, Industry Canada also admits to seeking an elite consensus: "to strengthen Canada's
voice and impact on issues of network and device interoperability, the federal government
should seek a stronger, more cooperative set of arrangements with Canadian Industry to put
forward Canadian positions to international standards bodies." (Industry Canada, Chapter 2:
Building Canada's Information Infrastructure, Strategis online: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca./
SSG/ihO640e.html> (publication date: 8 October 1997) [hereinafter "Chapter 2"]).
94. As Saul states: "[Direct democracy] is the ideal consummation of the rational as irrational, of
the anti-democratic posing as democracy. The complex issues of reality, which democracy can deal
with in its own slow, indirect way, are swept aside by single, clear issues" (supra note 86 at 109).
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Human Rights Research and Education Centre, demonstrate the seduc-
tiveness of this reasoning:
It is suggested that the need to promote consensual alliances with stake-
holders will be critical in dealing with.., even privacy concerns on the
Internet .... It will require, in effect, a new form of governance of society
where what are to be the fundamental shared values that a democratic
society has not only the right, but also more importantly the ability to
enforce, are ordained not by the elite, but agreed upon by consensual
alliances of citizens' groups, the private sector, and traditional govern-
mental mechanisms.95
The Act was created by group negotiations and multistakeholder
consensual alliances, as the then Industry Minister John Manley 96 and
Industry Canada's official documents 97 proudly assert.
The Act demonstrates that the process of direct consultation, negotiation
and consensus-building legitimize the decisions of informal private
governments without actually addressing concerns that conflict with the
elite consensus. Citizens' voices may have been heard, but they were
systematically ignored in the final formulation of the Act. The divergence
95. E. Mendes, "Democracy, Human Rights and the New Information Technologies in the
21st Century - the Law and Justice of Proportionality and Consensual Alliances" (1999) 10
N.J.C.L. 351 at 367.
The promotion of initiatives like 'Team Canada' (where corporations and government travel
together abroad to create international networks) is used as an example of the democratic and
egalitarian efforts of the federal government. It states:
Another feature of the changing scene in Canada is the democratization of foreign
policy... Foreign affairs are less and less an exclusive concern of the federal government
and more and more a "Team Canada" effort. [emphasis added]
Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Common Reviewing Canadian
Foreign Policy 1994, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future
(Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate) [emphasis added].
96. "We started public consultations on the need for privacy legislation in 1994. We
announced our intent to legislate in 1996 and we sought public comment on proposals for the
legislation in 1998. These consultations overwhelmingly supported the use of the CSA standard
as a basis for private sector privacy legislation." (Issue 5 Senate hearings, supra note 37)
97. In justifying the use of the CSA Standard in the Act the document states: "The Standard
demonstrates the continued commitment of participating parties to fair information practices
.... The result of cooperation among a wide cross-section of interest groups, it is truly a
remarkable achievement." (ECOM4, supra note 8) And further commentary:
The protection of personal information is achieved by bringing into law the Canadian
Standards Association Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information. The
CSA Standard was developed in a consensus process that included representatives from
a broad spectrum of interests including industry, the public sector, consumer groups and
labour organizations.
Senate, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Evidence, issue 1 (25
Nov. 1999) at 13.
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of citizens' expectations of the content of the Act (broadly based privacy
protection) and its actual substantive provisions (focusing on data protec-
tion) demonstrate this. As the Standing Committee concluded:
Everywhere the Committee traveled, participants in our townhall discus-
sions asked that the government create a legal framework to establish
ground rules for the protection of privacy .... We do not believe that
Canadians want ground rules to protect only their informational privacy,
leaving the rest of their privacy rights to languish in a lawless frontier.98
The divergence of citizen expectations and the reality of the statute
ultimately enacted are convincingly portrayed by the results of the public
consultation conducted in 1998 by Industry Canada99 and the writings of
legal academics.l°0
98. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 25 [emphasis added].
99. Some may argue that consensualism and compromise mean that no party leaves
negotiations satisfied, hence both business and citizens sacrificed some interests to ensure the
Act was created. The consultation paper produced by Industry Canada indicates clearly that
throughout the process of creating the Act citizens have not been satisfied by its results,
whereas corporate interests have generally been fulfilled.
The consultation document categorizes the responses to the preliminary Act by responses
received from Privacy Commissioners, Consumer Groups (including organized labour),
Telecommunications and Cable Sector, the Financial Sector, Commercial and Retail
Organizations, Information Technology Associations, Individuals (including consultants,
experts and academics) and other groups.
The report stated that "Privacy commissioners, consumer groups and individuals favour
greaterprecision... In contrast, the majority of business organizations would prefer to see the
CSA Standard adopted without any changes. Their view is that... more onerous requirements
could stifle private sector activity."
Specifically, the report concludes that "All privacy commissioners support statutory
privacy legislation, but all view the CSAL Standard as requiring substantive improvements if
it is to become the basis for privacy law." Almost two pages of recommendations of changes
follow.
As for consumer groups, the report states: "All consumer organizations support a federal
private sector privacy law, but none believe the CSA Standard is currently sufficient as a basis
for legislation." The submissions of individuals concurred: "No individual thought the CSA
Standard was sufficient without changes." Most tellingly, the report then lists three pages of
substantive changes recommended by individuals and consumer groups that would have
fundamentally altered the form and nature of the legislation. The most significant
recommendation of the consumer groups was that of adding a right of privacy to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Individual recommendations included: adding principles
from the Privacy Charter, incorporating six principles from the Australian Privacy Charter,
reflecting the fair information practices of the Quebec Act, clarifying consent, limiting
information collection to the absolute minimum required, requiring that information can only
be collected directly from the individual, including a right to self-determination of health
records and prohibiting surveillance except for law enforcement purposes.
In contrast, the summarized submissions of the business community are contained in
two pages with few suggestions of changes to the legislation (supra note 5).
100. See also U. Franklin, "Stormy Weather: Conflicting Forces in the Information Society",
presentation September 19, 1995 at the 18th International Conference for Privacy and Data
Protection, Ottawa, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/
english/02 05_a_960918_05_.e.htm>(dateaccessed: 13 May2001) [hereinafter"Stormy Weather"].
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2. The Consumerization of Citizenship
If government is managed by non-citizen groups, their entitlement to
public goods and services must bejustified in the marketplace rather than
through the democratic rights and obligations that only citizens can
possess. The market both equalizes the rights of business and individuals
and reduces the individual to the role of a 'stakeholder' or 'consumer'
who must consume goods, as opposed to debating, arguing and exercising
rights. As Ursula Franklin states,
[w]hile those who primarily locate themselves in the human rights climate
speak about citizens ... those who use the market language speak primarily
about stakeholders. And when one speaks about rights and obligations, the
other speaks about binding contracts.' 0'
Government may perceive its function, then, as fulfilling the market
needs of its stakeholders instead of legitimizing the democratic rights of
its citizenry. This governmental role robs from citizens the only mechanism
(democracy) through which they can meaningfully exercise collective
power.
The use of terms such as "customers", "consumers", "clients" and
"stakeholders" to describe interactions of citizens with government
services and institutions further affirms the consumerization of citizenship.
The use of these terms is not merely ideologically offensive - it is
inaccurate. Citizens can be neither the customers nor clients of public
services since citizens are in fact their employers; this relationship "is not
tied to purchase or value for money, but to responsibility.' 0 2
Consumerism renders citizens into tractable subjects, making them
uninterested in challenging abrogations of their rights. In a society where
personal information is collected for the purposes of niche marketing and
analyzing consumer preference, the market is portrayed as a sort of
"Santa Claus: be good and you'll get your presents."' 3 Unlike historical
surveillance states, this new power is not used in an overtly coercive
manner, which "instinctively repels most people."'"
101. Ibid. at 2.
102. Supra note 86 at 96. The most accurate term to describe a citizen in the corporatist model
would be 'shareholder' however even this term is inaccurate since citizens realize no monetary
profits from their investment of taxes nor can those shares be bought and sold.
103. R.Whitaker,"Commentary onGregoy .Walters, 'DigitizingTechnology,Transforming
Ourselves' (1999) 10 N.J.C.L. 437 at 440.
104. Ibid. at 440. Whitaker has pointed out that the surveillance society effects the same
results as a surveillance state. Corporations in a surveillance societies are risk averse. The
consequence of presenting a risk (determined through surveillance) is exclusion from the
marketplace. As Whitaker states: "those excluded by the surveillance society find themselves
pretty much in the same position as those excluded by the security screening of the surveillance
state." (Ibid. at 441).
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The discourse of "stakeholders" and "consumers" permeates the
creation of the Act, involuntarily demonstrating the substitution of
citizens with rights by consumers with needs. The legislation should be
"consumer friendly","°S and will require "consumer" (not public)
education. 0 6 The CSA Standard represents a consensus among
"stakeholders"'' 07 where the needs of business to collect and the
"consumer's" need (not right) to be informed must be balanced. 18
3. The Effects of Consumerism on Governmental Decision-making
Perceiving citizens as consumers in a marketplace allows legislators to
ask narrow questions that lead to particular answers. As Ursula Franklin
states,
[t]hose who deal primarily in the language and the forces of the market, see
the world as becoming more and more a transparent, interlinked produc-
tion site. Those of us who primarily come from, and are nourished in the
tradition of human rights and justice, have a view of the world that
hopefully makes the world more and more like a garden in which we all can
walk, and in which we all have to be vigilant about the weeds, the plants,
and the behavior of all those who use the garden for food, living, habitat
and recreation. 109
Government decision making promotes the appearance of problem-
solving and administrative efficiency over results by focusing on self-
interest instead of the public good, and the market instead of the human
fights of citizens. Being seen to solve a problem is more important than
its genuine final resolution. The production site which legislation seeks
to regulate is managed by the "rational" judgment of technocrats and
experts who can best predict its growth. 10 The short-term solutions that
result from self-interested decision making are ultimately destructive of
society since they are not broadly based on a shared vision of society."'
105. Supranote9.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Industry Canada, "Privacy: The protection of personal information", online: Strategis
<http://ecom.ic.gc.ca/english/privacy/632d6.html> (publication date: 8 November 2001).
109. Stormy Weather, supra note 100 at 2.
110. Supra note 86 at 102.
111. Ibid. at 33.
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The Act is the predictable product of a technical, method-oriented
approach which is not responsive to the broader policy concerns that
should engage government. As the Standing Committee confirms,
[c]onsequently, the protective framework we are proposing here [the
Privacy Charterl wilt capture the full breadth of privacy, like a wide angle
lens taking in a panoramic view, as opposed to the data protection
framework toward which the Industry and Justice Ministers are working
that focuses, like a close-up lens, tightly on informationalprivacy rights." 12
In its pursuit of process and method, the government has neglected
what it claimed to be the broader policy purpose of the Act (to protect
privacy). It has created a "light, regulatory framework which does not
impose a heavy burden on industry."' 13 Citizens must vigilantly protect
themselves against the rights that have been granted to non-citizen
business and guard against the conformist influence of their status as
'consumer'.
4. The Protection of Human Rights: Lost in the Commodity Shuffle
The protection of personal information as a market commodity results
from the consumerization of citizenship, reliance on the market to
mediate disputes and the focus on method and self-interest. Short-term
results ensue, minimizing or negating the human right to privacy. The
commodification of information objectifies human interactions, frag-
ments communities and molds social relations to the market model by
relegating information, whose free exchange is vital to the creation and
maintenance of communities and relationships, to the status of a market
good. ' 14
112. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 25. [emphasis added]
113. As Industry Canada states: "In a light regulatory framework which does not impose a
heavy burden on industry, consumer education is especially important to ensure that citizens
are well informed about their privacy rights and are vigilant in protecting them" (supra note
89).
114. The flow of information in a community has been analyzed to consist of gift, threat and
exchange information. All three types of information flow must occur in a healthy society,
however the market model enables only the exchange of information. Kenneth Boulding has
warned that, as a result, we face economic and social break-down since the commodification,
not integration, of social relationships reduces our sense of community:
The instability of capitalism may arise partly out of certain technical defects of an
elaborate exchange system that results in unemployment and depression; it also results,
however, from certain delegitimations of exchange, which may well arise because of
strong preferences for integrative relationships, which are, after all, personally much
more satisfying than exchange. To do things for love always seems to be more moral
and progressive than to do things for money ... capitalism undermines itself... because
of the failure of exchange institutions, such as finance, banking, corporations, and so on,
to develop an integrative matrix that will legitimate them.
K. Boulding, The Economy of Love and Fear: A Preface to the Grants Economy (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973) at 110.
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A focus on data protection that constructs personal information as a
commodity misrepresents the nature of information. Information enjoys
unquestioned commodity status in the 'high-tech' economy. Upon closer
inspection it may not be so easily classifiable. Robert Babe, a prominent
Canadian communications scholar has argued that information is
immaterial - what is quantifiable is the medium through which it is
transmitted (i.e. bits of data, pages of text). Hence "[t]he disembodied or
incorporeal character of information presents difficulties for economic
analysis."11 Information's value and the interpretation of its content vary
according to the characteristics of source and receiver; thus, information
depends on relationships and interactions and is difficult to define
objectively.116 Information is infinitely reproducible, indivisible and can
be used without reducing its availability. It is also difficult to commodify
information as it cannot be valued without information, which then itself
cannot be valued without information leading to an infinite regression. 117
Arguably, while information possesses characteristics which allow it to
fit within the box of "market goods", it should also be firmly planted in
the garden of 'human rights'." 8
115. Babe, supra note 93 at 16.
116. Even Industry Canada recognizes this when it states:
Ideas and information exhibit very different characteristics from the goods and services
of the industrial economy... the social value of ideas and information increases to the
degree they can be shared with and used by others .... The more such items [ideas,
information, innovation] are produced, the greater the social return on investment.
Industry Canada, Chapter 6: An Information Highway for Jobs and Growth, Strategis online:
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ih01644e.html> (publication date: 8 October 2001).
117. See generally Babe, supra note 93 at 11, 205.
118. Strong forces counter the consideration of information as a human right. For example, if
information is considered a human right, then Southern 'developing' nations could insist on a "free
and balanced flow" of information. These nations would not then have to export large quantities of
food and resources to pay for Western information (enclosed through intellectual property law) that
is crucial for development. Information as a human right would severely diminish profits of
transnational corporations, hence is unlikely to gain wide currency. (Ibid. at 44.)
The following excerpt foreshadows the resistance of business to the specific proposal by
Senator Finestone to "enshrine Canadians' right to freedom from surveillance [and] the use of
personal data by others":
An expert in Internet law warned the proposal would be seen as a handicap by Canadian
businesses trying to use the Internet. "Business would see it as an impingement on their
rights," said Michael Geist, a law professor at the University of Ottawa who specializes
in the Internet.
Online: The Canadian Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/36/pb-gob.pl?e>
(date accessed: 5 November 2000).
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Shifting the debate about the privacy of personal information away
from the commodification of information' 9 has been broadly supported
by the Standing Committee 20 and in particular by Paul-Andr6 Comeau,
Privacy Commissioner of Quebec, who warned at the committee hear-
ings,
[i]t is dangerous and, at any rate, it could be very harmful for Canadians
to see a debate focusing solely on the commercial value of information
pertaining to privacy. Of course this information does have a commercial
value, but it is first and foremost a question of basic rights.' 2'
If information is not unequivocally a commodity, then its receivers
should not be so readily called consumers. If receivers are not best seen
as consumers then they should once again be regarded as citizens who
have rights. It is then that the discourse shifts to consider human rights,
22
in particular the right to privacy of personal information.
Privacy is a polymorphous concept that is notoriously difficult to
categorize. Four major features have been identified. 23 Privacy exists as
an expression of personality or personhood and of personal autonomy. It
also encompasses the right to arrange one's relationships by controlling
information about oneself. Finally, privacy may also consist of "secrecy,
anonymity and solitude.' '1 24
In the Canadian context, the right of privacy is given more substance
but no clear definition materializes. In the words of the Standing Committee
"privacy is reflected through many lenses. What emerges is a consensus
which consists of a rainbow of values, interests, knowledge and experi-
ences.''125 Canadians perceive privacy as a fundamental societal right that
is necessary for the exercise of other rights (such as freedom of expres-
sion). 26 Privacy is grounded in dignity and autonomy and is an integral
part of our society's collective value system. Functionally, privacy leads
to a more transparent, candid and open society by nurturing and enabling
119. The approach adopted by the drafters of the Act (supra note 113).
120. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 5.
12 1. Ibid. at 6.
122. The Standing Committee adds:
[I]f we approach privacy issues from a human rights perspective, the principles and
solutions we arrive at will be rights-affirming, people-based, humanitarian ones. On the
other hand, if we adopt a market-based or economic approach, the solutions will reflect
a different philosophy, one that puts profit margins and efficiency before people, and
may not first and foremost serve the common good.
Ibid.
123. F.H. Cate, Privacy in the Information Age (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1997) at 19.
124. Ibid.
125. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 1.
126. Ibid.
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relationships within communities. 27 Its protection by government ex-
presses a vision or policy of society. 18
The Standing Committee has attempted to give legislative substance
to the right of privacy through the Privacy Charter.129 The Act falls short
of its ostensible goal to protect privacy (see 'Purpose', section 3) when
measured against the standards of both the Canadian Privacy Charter and
the Australian Privacy Charter. 30 Most importantly, the Act creates no
binding obligations - instead its substantive privacy protections are only
recommendations. 3 Thus the Act violates provision 1.2 of the proposed
Privacy Charter which guarantees that "those privacy rights will be
respected by others adopting whatever protective measures are most
appropriate to do so."' 32
The Act weakly enforces s. 1.2 of the Privacy Charter which proposes
that "violations of these privacy rights ... will be subject to proper
redress."'13  Under Principle 4.9 (in particular 4.9.5) of the Act, if
individuals successfully challenge the accuracy of information about
them then the organization 'shall' amend the information. However, if the
individual is not satisfied with the proposed amendment, then the
organization is merely recommended to record the substance of the
dispute.'34 Principle 10 recommends that organizations establish
procedures to 'receive and respond' to complaints about compliance with
the Act. An individual can file a complaint with the Commissioner if an
organization fails to follow a recommendation in Schedule 1115 but can
only apply to the Federal Court for a hearing after receiving the
Commissioner's report. The obligation to redress privacy violations is
placed on the citizen. This situation seems inequitable when one consid-
ers that the government could have directly assumed the obligation for
127. Response, supra note 59 at 447.
128. Ibid. at 449.
129. Privacy Charter, supra note 59.
130. I have chosen to compare the Act to the Canadian and Australian Privacy Charters, as
opposed to the EU directive, because I believe that both Charters more accurately reflect the
Canadian perspective on privacy protection (this conclusion derives primarily from the
Standing Committee's results) and are distinctly not the product of the consensual alliance
process of decision-making that I critique. Also, other authors have exhausted the comparison
of the Act to the EU Directive. I will refer to the provisions of the Australian Privacy Charter
when they differ or provide a useful definition for provisions of the Canadian Privacy Charter.
(Response, supra note 59)
131. Supra note 2, s. 5.
132. Response, supra note 59. The Australian Privacy Charter contains similar language to
the Canadian Privacy Charter: "Australians value privacy, They expect that their rights to
privacy be recognised and protected." (Supra note 61.)
133. A similar provision is contained in Principle 4 of the Australian Privacy Charter.
134. Supra note 2, Sch. I, principle 4.9.6.
135. Ibid., s. 11.
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enforcement through the commonly established licensing or registration
regime, complemented by a mechanism to investigate and prosecute
(similar to enforcement under the Human Rights Act). 3 6 No right of
enforcement is directly provided against the organization which is under
no binding duty to resolve the dispute or respond to the complainant in a
timely manner. There is no right to directly appeal the organization's
response. Access to court is restricted until after the lengthy process of
investigation (up to one year) is completed by the Commissioner.
Section 3 of the proposed Privacy Charter outlines six primary "duties"
to ensure that privacy rights have been "adequately respected."
Recommendations fail to create the 'duties' required by s. 3.1 of the
Privacy Charter. The Act does not even address two of the duties
contained in s. 3 of the Privacy Charter. In particular, there is no duty to
"use and provide access to privacy enhancing technologies"1 37 nor is
there any guarantee that privacy protection be built into technological
design.
Section 3.1 mandates a duty to secure meaningful consent. The
Australian Privacy Charter stipulates that "'consent' is meaningless if
people are not given information or have no option but to consent" as well
as requiring that individuals have a right to withdraw their consent. 38 On
the positive side, Principle 4.3.2 of the Act specifically addresses how
consent becomes meaningful when the individual can reasonably
understand the purposes for which the information will be used.
13 9
Meaningful consent is also promoted by Principle 4.3.3 which provides
that consent cannot be given beyond the purposes for which that informa-
tion will be used. As well, consent shall not be obtained through
deception' 4 and individuals are allowed to withdraw consent."'
However, the existence of meaningful consent is diminished by
Principles 4.3.0, 4.3.1 and 4.3.4-7. Consent does not have to be obtained
136. The government could have adopted a much more stringent enforcement procedure
involving either registration or licensing, models adopted in European countries. The 'data
commissioner' model is perceived to be an intermediate level of data protection. A registration
scheme would require the public and private sector to register their databases with a federal
government agency. Government agencies can then regulate and de-register databases as they
see fit. A licensing scheme requires prior government approval of all database uses. (Managing
Privacy, supra note 10 at 212.) See also Standing Committee, supra note 3 at t9.
137. There is a reference in Principle 4.7.3 to the use of technological measures to protect
information. Supra note 2, Sch. I.
138. Supra note 61, Principle 2.
139. In Schedule I this is termed the "knowledge and consent" requirement (Supra note 2,
Sch. I. principle 4.3.2).
140. Ibid. principle 4.3.5.
141. Ibid. principle 4.3.8.
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 281
A Lost Opportunity to Democratize Canada's "Technological Society"
where it would be inappropriate, 42 in particular where a third party has
no direct relationship with the individual. 14 Consent is not sought in
those situations because it would be 'impractical' for the third party. This
exemption potentially engulfs the rule since as more personal information
is collected, exchanged and combined a larger proportion of it falls into
the hands of third parties for whom it is impractical to seek consent from
the individual concerned. It is not specified who decides or on what basis
consent is deemed to be inappropriate. The Schedule contains no provision
similar to that of the Australian Privacy Charter which requires that
"[c]ollection should be from the person concerned, if practicable."'" In
addition, consent can be obtained after information is collected.'45
Hence, individuals can have information collected for one purpose and
can then be asked to consent to another use of the information when the
information is no longer within their control.
146
The form of consent required varies with the type and circumstances
of the information' 47 and, in particular, implied consent is said to be
appropriate when information is "less sensitive".'4" Consent that is
implied and not express is not meaningful in this context.'49 In addition,
there is a wide and arbitrary discretion given to organizations to determine
when a particular use of information is 'less sensitive'. Specifying that
medical and income records are more sensitive than the names and
addresses of subscribers to a magazine5 ° fails to adequately substantiate
this discretion. Additionally, what may be a less sensitive use of personal
information to an organization may not be considered less sensitive to an
142. Ibid., principle 4.3.0.
143. The Schedule uses the example of a "charity or direct marketing firm that wishes to
acquire a mailing list from another organization" (Note - ibid. principle 4.3.0).
144. Supra note 61, principle 11.
145. Supra note 2, principle 4.3.1.
146. Note that Principle 4.2.4 recommends that consent be obtained if information is used for
a new purpose. Ibid.
147. Ibid., principle 4.3.4.
148. Ibid., principle 4.3.6. Note as well that there is no statutory definition of informed
consent even though one is provided in s. 2.1.0 of the CSA Code.
149. The Standing Committee has specifically addressed this issue, stating: "We do not
believe that consent to privacy invasions should ever be implied." (Standing Committee, supra
note 3 at 24) Principle 2 of the Australian Privacy Charter stipulates that meaningful consent
requires full information. (Supra note 61.)
150. Supra note 2, pinciple 4.3.4.
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individual.'5 ' Further, there is no obligation that consent be freely given
and independent of coercion.
The Act also provides that consent can be given by negative implication,
which like implied consent, is not meaningful since it has not been
expressly given with full knowledge. 152 Individuals are not warned if they
fail to give consent when consent is required. If consent is withdrawn then
an organization is only advised to inform the individual "of the implications
of such withdrawal" (i.e. that if consent is withdrawn then there is no
consent).'53 However, there is no requirement that the organization
respect the withdrawal of that consent or even act upon it.'54
The standard of consent that I suggest is common in other spheres, for
example, in the criminal law. Relevant consent provisions in s. 273.1 of
the Criminal Code hold, for example, that,
No consent is obtained, for the purposes of [sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault
or sexual assault with a weapon] where...
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position
of trust, power or authority;
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses by words
or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.
The criminal standard of consent requires that the consent must be both
voluntary, affirmatively given and activity specific. Consent cannot be
implied as a defence to sexual assault. Consent can be withdrawn at any
time and that lack of consent must be immediately respected. 5 R. v.
Ewanchuk further holds that claiming silence, passivity or ambiguous
conduct show consent to sexual acts is not a defence to sexual assault.
Although the context of data protection is very different from that of
151. For example, a person's social insurance number indicates whether they are a recent
immigrant. An individual may not wish to disclose this information when applying for a job
to avoid discrimination.
152. Supra note 138. Principle 4.3.7 (b) provides that if one does not check a box that would
prevent information from being given to another organization, then consent has been given.
This type of consent led to a large outcry in Canada in January 1995 when the cable television
industry introduced new cable television services to all its customer at an increased cost and
consumers had to write to specifically request not to be provided those services. For more
information see online: Industry Canada, <<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00887e.html>>
(date accessed: 8 May 2001).
153. Supra note 2, Sch. I, principle 4.3.8.
154. For example, there is nothing to prevent an organization from stating that the implication
of the withdrawal of consent is that nothing changes with respect to that information.
155. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
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sexual assault, the criminal definition of consent can be used as a
framework for obtaining meaningful consent.
Section 3.1 of the Privacy Charter requires that if privacy rights must
be infringed, then the means must be minimally impairing. Specific
provisions of the Act can be identified that attempt to minimally impair
the infringement of privacy rights. The collection, 5 6 use and disclosure
of personal information is limited to identified purposes"57 and information
can only be retained for "as long as necessary for the fulfilment of those
purposes.11158 However, organizations are only required to document (not
inform individuals) of the use of personal information for new purposes. 5 9
There is no provision in the Act, as in the Australian Privacy Charter, that
a "minimum amount of personal information should be collected.""6
Additionally, the Schedule suggests that organizations establish maximum
and minimum retention period for information, without providing a strict
standard of what those retention periods should be.' 6' Personal information
that is no longer useful should be "destroyed, erased, or made
anonymous."' 62 This provision incorrectly equates making information
anonymous with destruction. Merely removing an identifier from data
allows it to be recycled in another form.
The duties to be accountable and transparent provided for in section
3.1 of the Privacy Charter 163 are implemented in the Act to a greater
degree than are the other duties of the Privacy Charter. The Act provides
that organizations must designate individuals to be accountable for their
compliance with the principles of Schedule I. 'I The organization must
develop procedures to protect personal information and to "receive and
respond to complaints and inquiries." ' 61 However, accountability is
merely a public relations faqade if there is no enforceable standard of a
right to privacy which can be used to challenge procedures and poor
responses to complaints.
Transparency requires that the purposes of personal information use
be identified, 66 documented 67 and specified to the individual from
156. Supra note 2, Sch. I. principle 4.4.1.
157. Ibid., principle 4.5.0. The Australian Privacy Charter contains a similar provision in
Principle 11.
158. Ibid., principle 4.5.0. The Australian Privacy Charter has no provisions respecting the
retention periods of personal information.
159. Ibid., principle 4.5.1.
160. Ibid., principle 11, Australian Privacy Charter [emphasis added].
161. Ibid., principle 4.5.2.
162. Ibid., principle 4.5.3.
163. Ibid., principles 3 and 5 of the Australian Privacy Charter.
164. Ibid., principle 4.1.0.
165. Ibid., principle 4.1.4(a-b).
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whom the information is collected.1 68 Schedule I, however, does not
create a positive duty which requires that the purpose will actually be
communicated to the individual. This is evident from the fact that the
Schedule does not require more than "specification" and that persons
collecting information "should" be able to explain the purposes of
collection.1 69 As well, there is no requirement that the purpose for
information collection be assessed to be valid or reasonable or that the
purpose be justified.
Transparency is also addressed through the principle of openness
about an organization's management of personal information. 70 However,
the term management is ambiguous. Does it relate to use or merely
collection of personal information? What degree of detail will be available?
Transparency, once again, is not sufficient to protect privacy if there are
no effective means to enforce privacy rights under the Act. As well, there
is no requirement in the Act similar to Principle 13 of the Australian
Privacy Charter which creates a positive duty for organizations to "make
people aware of the existence of personal information held about them."
A legislative focus on method at the expense of content is demonstrated
by the focus of the Act on procedural rights like accountability and
transparency and its legislative treatment of more substantive rights to
privacy (e.g. consent).
The Act does not address the specific rights to ownership and anonymity
of personal information provided for in section 4.1 of the Privacy
Charter. 7 ' There is no protection in the Act of the autonomy interest
protected by ownership of personal information. 172 The sensitivity (and
presumably anonymity) of data varies with the source from which it is
collected; 73 however, this sensitivity is only protected through safeguards
designated at the discretion of the organization. 74 It is problematic that
determining the level of protection is placed at the discretion of the
166. Ibid., principle 4.2.0.
167. Ibid., principle 4.2.1.
168. Ibid., principle 4.2.3.
169. Ibid., principle 4.2.5.
170. Ibid., principle 4.8.
t7 1. The Australian Privacy Charter does not provide for a right to ownership of personal
information. However, the Charter protects anonymity in Principle 10, which stipulates that
"people should have the option of not identifying themselves when entering transactions."
(Supra note 61.)
172. I propose that ownership be interpreted (in the spirit of the Standing Committee's report)
as those who possess the right to enforce the obligations outlined under the Privacy Charter as
opposed to an affirmation of the commodity status of personal information.
173. Supra note 2, Sch. I, principles 4.3.4, 4.7.2.
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: 285
A Lost Opportunity to Democratize Canada's "Technological Society"
organization who will pay the increased costs of that security. There is no
specific recommendation in the Act that personal information be treated
as confidential or anonymous and organizations are merely recommended
to inform their employees of the confidentiality of personal information.
There is no requirement that a confidentiality agreement be completed if
information is transmitted to a third party.
The obligations under section 5 of the Privacy Charter, as the Standing
Committee reports, are primarily those recognized under the CSA Code.
75
However, the Act does not address two of the obligations under s. 5 (that
are also not contained in the CSA Code). First is the duty to hold sensitive
information in trust. This obligation protects anonymity and relationships
by mandating that collectors of medical, financial or genetic information
should be held to the higher standard of care of "trusteeship" with respect
to the handling of that information. 176 Secondly, the Act does not protect
individuals from adverse effects if they choose to exercise their privacy
rights. Such a provision would protect the autonomy of individuals by
forbidding the provision of inferior service, no service or increased costs
for a service if individuals refuse to provide personal information.1
77
By comparing the Act to the provisions of the Privacy Charter and the
Australian Privacy Charter, it becomes evident that the government has
failed to emerge from its narrow analysis of data protection to meaningfully
fulfill the obligations of a right to privacy. The substantive privacy
protections of the Act are recommendations not obligations; citizens are
not provided with adequate means of redressing violations; there is no
duty not to disadvantage people when they choose to exercise their rights
to privacy; consent is not required to be meaningful; there is no declara-
tion that individuals are the owners of their personal information nor is
there any general provision that personal information is confidential. As
a result, the Act may address the needs of consumers whose interests must
174. Ibid. principle 4.7.
175. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 25.
176. The Supreme Court of Canada explicitly found a duty to hold sensitive medical
information in trust in Mclnerney v. MacDonald, [19921 2 S.C.R. 138.
177. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 25. Although Principle 4.3.3 attempts to address
this concern, it only recommends that organizations shall not require consent to the "collection,
use, or disclosure of information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and
legitimate purposes." Thus organizations can refuse access to products or services if a person
refuses to consent to the use of her information for the specified purpose.
The Australian Privacy Charter states in Principle 2 that "'consent' is meaningless if people.
. have no option but to consent in order to obtain a benefit or service." Also, the Charter
stipulates that "a desire for privacy does not mean that a persbn has 'something to hide'. People
who wish to protect their privacy should not be required to justify their desire to do so."
[emphasis added] (Supra note 61.)
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be balanced with those of business, but it fails to protect citizens as
individuals with rights to privacy.
5. The Process of Legitimizing the Legislation: Sugar-Coating Bad
Medicine
The apparent acceptance of (or lack of audible protest to) the Act's data
protection provisions results from a perception of technological
development as inherent or inevitable. Technological determinism posits
that technology evolves autonomously according to its own internal
logic; societies must then adapt to the development of technology at all
its stages (technological inevitability). 78
The language of determinism pervades Industry Canada's documents
which portray the "knowledge society" as the result of an unavoidable
historical trend: "[during the industrial revolution] an urban manufacturing
economy displaced an essentially rural and agricultural society. Now we
are experiencing an equally profound shift to a knowledge-based
economy." 7 9
The "information society" is portrayed as not only historically necessary;
it is also said to develop according to the unavoidable processes of
evolutionary biology. In the words of the Information Highway Advisory
Council (IHAC) "the information economy is still in its infancy."'18 0
However, "[t]he technology and information infrastructure will be the
central nervous system of the new economy and society"'' where "the
knowledge, information, data and services traveling the Information
Highway" will form "the lifeblood of the knowledge based economy." 18 2
Technology that evolves like humans is also endowed with human
abilities, such as the ability to engage in non-discriminatory expression:
179. A. Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (Oxford" Oxford University Press, 1991) at
123.
179. Chapter 6, supra note 116.
180. Supra note 89 [emphasis added].
181. Industry Canada, Chapter 1: Toward a Society Built on Knowledge, online: Strategis
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca./SSG/ihO1639e.html> (publication date: 8 October 1997). [hereinafter
"Chapter 1"] [emphasis added].
182. Chapter 6, supra note 116 [emphasis added].
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"the Internet's most powerful feature is that it allows computers and
networks to communicate openly and effectively, regardless of make..
.183 However, in order to properly mythologize technology it must have
superhuman powers: "Over the past three years, the Internet has begun to
pervade the lives of many Canadians .... Ultimately the technology
promises to extend and improve dramatically learning, health and other
public services." 84
Since technology is constantly evolving, Canadians have "no option
but to vigorously embrace the development and dissemination of the new
technologies." 185 The technological imperative'8 6 requires an urgent
response as otherwise Canadians will find themselves falling further.
behind in the international race to improve productivity of all sectors of
the Canadian economy. 87 We must be advised that "[a] social, economic
and cultural revolution is now transforming the world" and "[a] new game
is starting, and the older rules no longer apply."' 88 Thus, "[lr]apid
technological advances demand that we formulate a legislative
framework"' 89 that outlines the new rules for the new game. Educational
institutions must create workers for the technological society: "Computer
and Internet literacy is a necessary precondition for success in the
emerging knowledge society and economy .... All levels of government
in Canada have been moving actively to ensure our educational institu-
tions can fulfill this role." 90
Not only must the economy adapt to the technological imperative, so
too must human social interactions: "[pihysical distance will disappear as
183. Industry Canada, Chapter 3: The Internet: Advancing the Information Highway, online:
Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca.ISSG/ihOI641e.html> (date accessed: 8 October 1997)
[hereinafter "Chapter 3"]. As well, [the Internet] has the potential to bring far-reaching benefits
and changes to Canada's economic life and industrial structure. It can generate profound shifts
in employment. It can create both global opportunities and a more competitive environment for
Canadian companies....
184. Ibid. [emphasis added]. See infra note 195.
185. Canada, Hon. Francis Fox, Minister of Communications, Culture and Communications:
Key Elements of Canada's Information and Communications Infrastructure (Ottawa: Supply
and Services, 1983) at 5.
186. "We have been delighted by the energetic response of industry, individuals and
community groups across the country to the imperative of developing Canada's Information
Highway" (Chapter 1, supra note 181) [emphasis added].
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. Supra note 89.
190. Industry Canada, Chapter 4: Access: The Cornerstone of the Information Society,
online: Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca./SSG/ihOI642e.html> (publication date: 8 October
1997) [hereinafter "Chapter 4"].
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a factor in human relations .... The creation, manipulation and sharing
of information and knowledge will become an overriding human
imperative."' 9 ' Culture, too, must adapt to the inevitable technological
transformation: "[a]rtists and creators need opportunities to develop their
skills by using the most sophisticated technology."' 92
Technology does not self-propagate - it is funded, researched, controlled
and disseminated largely by businesses. 9 3 Technology is owned and
developed, and its use generates a divisible profit.' 94 If technology is
perceived to be inevitable then citizens must adapt to the changes instead
of attempting to control those changes and question the distribution of
benefits from those changes. Thus the Act is necessary to outline the rules
of the inevitable technological development that is required to secure
economic and social security in Canada. Canadians must, in their best
interests, surrender their personal information as fuel for the 'knowledge
economy' without directly receiving any of the profits business acquires
from its use. Government and industry have failed to ask many vital
questions. Does technology lead to economic and social security? This
question is critical in light of economic measurements that are unable to
demonstrate an increase in productivity or market efficiency due to the
increaseduse oftechnology. 195 Do Canadians want a society which gives
technology such prominence?' 96 Are new technologies appropriate or
necessary or even reasonablyjustifiable in a free and democratic society?
Do Canadians really want new technologies or their products, such as
191. Supranotel8l.
192. Industry Canada, Chapter 5: Canadian Content: Creating an Information Highway for
Canadians, online: Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca./SSG/ih0I643e.html> (publication date:
8 October 1997) [hereinafter "Chapter 5"].
193. For an interesting study of how the development of the information highway is firmly
controlled by Canadian corporations see Babe, supra note 93 at 199.
194. Supra note 88.
195. Legislators ignore the well-documented productivity paradox - that, for example,
service industries spent $860 billion in the 1980's on technological solutions to improve their
productivity. However, their productivity only increased by 0.8% per year (E.con, supra note
62 at 244). IHAC attempts to dismiss the productivity paradox by blaming the measurement
tools: "the federal government should continue its national and international efforts to create
useful economic and social indicators. This work should proceed as rapidly as
possible". [emphasis added].(Chapter 6, supra note 116.) Thus, technology provides economic
benefits - we just cannot measure them.
196. As the Standing Committee reports: "participants felt that we will be unable to find the
appropriate balance [between civil society and technology] if we 'continue to allow technology
to be the tail that wags the dog"' (supra note 3 at 4).
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direct marketing? 97 Should the Canadian government be investing in
technological or community-based solutions?
The passive response to the Act may result from the effects of the
"Santa Claus market"' 98 and the powerlessness engendered both by the
governance of self-interested groups and the apparent inevitability of
technological development. As well, citizens are poorly informed of the
prevalence of technology (for example, surveillance technologies such as
video cameras and ticket readers) and its capabilities. This lack of
information is justified by the fact that informing the citizenry changes
nothing if technological development is inevitable. 199
However, the technological society prefers that citizens remain ignorant
of the uses of their personal information2°° as most would demand greater
protection for their privacy rights,"0' which would increase business
costs. For example, the Canadian Privacy survey completed by Ekos
concluded that respondents "would be more at ease with others using their
personal information if they had control over this information, knew their
privacy rights were protected and knew government exercised some form
of oversight or monitoring of these activities.
'
"202
The names that government and industry have chosen to define the
debate about privacy have silenced the voices of those who oppose its
content. As Patricia Monture has stated, "[n]ot being in control of the
process of naming - that is defining who you are - serves as one of the
197. A survey by Bell Canada found that 98% of customers found telemarketing to be "very
annoying." As a response, the Canadian Direct Marketing Association provided a phone
number that one could call to be removed from telemarketing lists. The service was so
overwhelmed by calls it was shut-down (Free Enterprise, supra note 17 at 9).
198. Supra note 101.
199. Standing Committee, supra note 3 at 5.
200. Commenting on the results of citizen focus groups, in a study of 3 major Banks, a Life
Insurance company, 2 major Health Insurance companies and a credit card company which
examined those organization's privacy practices, the author commented:
Thus, the focus groups often turned into an educational experience for the consumers
As they learned more about the various policies and practices [of the corporations],
many consumers because angry ....
These findings stand as a stark reminder to industries handling sensitive personal
information: if policies and practices are deemed offensive by consumers, simply
providing consumer education about existing policies and practices may be a
counterproductive endeavour [for business] [emphasis added].
Managing Privacy, supra note 10 at 149
201. This is recognized by Industry Canada when it proposes that consumers be educated so
as to vigilantly protect their rights (supra note 113).
202. Supra note 37.
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most express examples of silencing that I can think of. '203 The legislative
acts of government have named the Act as the "privacy bill" not the e-
commerce bill. 2' The management of personal information is called
"data protection" and citizens have been named as "consumers". Rights
are named as "market needs and desires" and private sector industry is
referred to as a "stakeholder".
Thus the perception of technological inevitability discourages questions
about the appropriateness of new technologies and justifies the ignorance
of citizens about its uses. The government's power to name the terms of
discussion effectively silences dissenting voices.
V. Recommendations and Conclusions
There is a sense of urgency surrounding the effective implementation of
privacy rights in Canada." 5 I do not believe it is reasonable to recommend
that the Act be repealed. However, there are three primary means through
which privacy rights can be enforced. First, a right of privacy can be
included in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, the
Privacy Charter can be enacted as law and finally the Act can be amended
to better protect Canadians.
1. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Privacy advocates have proposed including a right to privacy in the
Charter.20 6 Some advantages are that privacy would become a right that
is enforceable by the courts. Its inclusion in the Constitution would grant
it symbolic significance in Canadian law. However, there are disadvan-
tages to the Charter approach. Privacy could only be included in the
Charter by amending the Constitution, which is a notoriously difficult
203. "Reflecting on Flint Woman" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 351 at 354.
204. A similar situation occurred when wiretapping provisions were introduced into the
Criminal Code by the Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50 in 1974. After judicial
comments, this section was renamed and included in the Criminal Code in Part VI under the
title "Invasion of Privacy."
205. Highlighted by the Standing Committee (supra note 3) which states:
As much as we found a sense of cautious optimism that it was not too late to protect our
privacy, we encountered a clear sense of urgency. People across the country called on
the government to act now or to risk losing the trust citizens have traditionally placed
in our legislators to balance our social good with economic and political goals
On a different note, Industry Canada states: "The global challenge to compete in the electronic
marketplace means we do not have time for a slow evolutionary approach to building up the
protection of personal information and consumer trust." (supra note 8).
206. Such advocates include Bruce Phillips (former federal Privacy Commissioner), Members
of Parliament David Crombie and Svend Robinson, the federal government itself in its 1979
proposal for the Constitution and Ann Cavoukian. (Ontario Information and Privacy
Commissioner), online: Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario <http://www.ipc.on.ca/
english/pubpres/reports/fine-Ol .htm> (date accessed: 8 May 2001).
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procedure. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada, as outlined
above, has defined ss. 7, 8 and 2(b) to include rights to privacy, dignity
and autonomy. It is unclear what further protection would be effected by
specifically including a right to privacy. A Charter right to privacy would
only directly apply to government action and would be subject to a s. 1
justification. The time and expense of mounting a constitutional challenge
make this option unattractive for regular and efficient enforcement.
2. The Privacy Charter
A second option is to enact a Privacy Charter as a Privacy Bill of Rights
(both federally and provincially). This option is attractive, as it would
constitute a broad policy statement by government that privacy deserves
protection. The detailed codification of a right to privacy is an ideal means
to greatly enhance the enforcement of that right.
Ideally, the Privacy Charter would be enacted as a Bill of Rights with
quasi-constitutional status which would then be complemented by
expanded funding and resources for the Privacy Commissioner. Individuals
would bring complaints to the Privacy Commissioner who would
investigate and prosecute violations of the Act (much like the Human
Rights Commission). °7 In this ideal world, the Act would be repealed
and replaced by a licensing scheme that would enable direct government
supervision of information gathering activities.
3. Improving the Act
The most realistic means by which the protection of privacy may be
improved would be to amend the Act, in light of the provisions of the
proposed Canadian Privacy Charter (the ideal situation), the Australian
Privacy Charter and the provisions of the Quebec Act.2"8 The provisions
of the Quebec Act are particularly influential as they are currently law and
are widely considered to effect substantive protection of privacy rights in
that province.209
The first major recommendation is to make the Schedule I provisions
binding obligations instead of recommendations. To ensure this happens,
ajustification provision could be added which provides that infringements
on privacy will be permitted only if they can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society. A general recommendation is that all
207. However, the creation of a separate scheme of human rights protection for privacy could
be perceived as privileging privacy rights over fights contained within human rights codes and
an unnecessary duplication.
208. An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, R.S.Q.,
c. P-39.1.
209. R. Ct6 & R. Laperfihre, Vie Prive Sous Surveillance (Quebec: Yvon Blais, 1994).
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provisions should be made more specific. In particular, some of the most
important prospective amendments to the Act and Schedule follow.
The current preamble to the Act should be amended to include a
statement that the Act recognizes the right of privacy of individual with
respect to their personal information to promote respect for the physical
and psychological autonomy, integrity and dignity of individuals.21° The
Act should also clearly state in its preamble that the protection of privacy
is currently threatened.
The Act, within its preamble or preliminary to further substantive
provisions, should state that the provisions of the Act must be interpreted
in light of:21'
* A right to physical privacy
* A right to privacy of personal information
" A right to a personal space in which to conduct affairs, ' 2 not only
in the home, but also "in the workplace, the use of recreational
facilities and public places"2"3
" A right to be free from surveillance, where surveillance would be
defined as including the monitoring of communications, movement
and personal information except if required under the Criminal
Code
• A right not to be disadvantaged because one chooses to exercise
privacy rights. The exercise of those rights does not have to be
justified.214
210. See Morgentaler and Jones, supra note 44.
211. Canadian Privacy Charter, supra note 59, s. 1.1.
212. The "zone of privacy" discussed in Jones, supra note 44.
213. Australian Privacy Charter, supra note 61, principle 8.
214. The Quebec Act contains such a provision:
Section 9. No person may refuse to respond to a request for goods or services or to a
request relating to employment by reason of the applicant's refusal to disclose personal
information except where
(I )collection of that information is necessary for the conclusion or performance
of a contract;
(2)collection of that information is authorized by law; or
(3)there are reasonable grounds to believe that the request is not lawful.
An equivalent provision exists in the residential tenancies regime in Nova Scotia, where s. 20
permits the Director to "refuse to exercise, in favour of a landlord, the powers or authorities
under this Act... [if it] is of the opinion that a landlord has acted in retaliation for a tenant
attempting to secure or enforce the tenant's rights under this Act .... (Residential Tenancies
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 401).
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Accountability
The accountability provisions should require that files containing per-
sonal information about an individual must specify the categories of
employees who will use and view the data2 5 and the specific source of
any information collected from a third party .216
Identifying Purposes
This section should include a declaration that personal information is
owned by the subject, whose meaningful consent would be required for
its use for specific purposes. 217 The provision should mandate a positive
duty that the purpose of information use be communicated to the
individual. The Act should expressly stipulate that individuals must be
informed of uses of their information for new purposes. All purposes
must be reasonably justifiable.
Consent
The consent provisions of Schedule I should be amended to include a
provision similar to the Privacy Charter and s. 14 of the Quebec Act to
provide that consent to the communication or use of personal information
must be meaningful, free, and knowledgeable and must be given for
specific purposes. Such consent is valid only for the length of time needed
to achieve the purposes for which it was requested. As well, the Act
should stipulate that consent that is not meaningful, free or knowledgeable
is not valid consent. 21 The Act should specifically prohibit implied
consent, and particularly consent by negative implication.
A further provision should be added to vitiate consent when a technology
does not serve the public good. A sample provision is contained in
principle 2 of the Australian Privacy Charter which states that "[i]n
exceptional situations the use or establishment of a technology or
personal data system may be against the public interest even if it is with
the consent of the individuals concerned."
The type of consent should not vary based on the sensitivity of
information involved. However, if this provision remains in the Schedule,
a precise definition of 'sensitive information' must be included. The Act
should specifically stipulate that if consent is withdrawn then information
must be erased or destroyed.
215. Section 8(2) of the Quebec Act requires that a person be informed of "the use which will
be made of the information and the categories of persons who will have access to it within the
enterprise." (supra note 52.)
216. Ibid.,s. 7.
217. Canadian Privacy Charter, supra note 59, s. 4.1
218. Quebec Act, supra note 52, s. 14.
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Limiting Collection
Collection must be limited to an absolute minimum. Personal informa-
tion should only be collected directly from the person involved. 19
Limiting Use, Disclosure and Retention
Specific retention periods should be included. Principle 4.5.3. should be
amended so that personal information that is no longer required should be
"destroyed or erased" only and not made anonymous.
Accuracy
Personal information should not be as accurate as the purposes require;
rather information should be as accurate as possible to ensure people are
not disadvantaged by erroneous and outdated information.
Safeguards
A requirement should be added to the Schedule and the preamble of the
Act that sensitive information be held in trust.220 Additionally, the Act
should specifically state that information will be held confidentially and
that safeguards must be implemented to maintain confidentiality.
Individuals should be entitled to demand that transactions occur and that
information be held anonymously. 22 1
Openness
The policy of openness should require organizations to inform people of
the existence of information held about them.222 The organization should
be required, not only to make available specific information about the
management of personal information, but information about specific
uses, categories of employees who have viewed the information and the
precise content of that information. This part should also include a
general statement of policy that openness is needed to facilitate public
participation in the protection of personal information.
Individual Access
This part should include a right to have information deleted and with-
drawn. 223 Additionally, it should require that no fees should be charged
to provide access to or amend data.
219. Ibid.,s. 6.
220. Canadian Privacy Charter, supra note 59, s. 5.1.
221. Australian Privacy Charter, supra note 61, principle 10.
222. Ibid., principle 13.
223. See generally Quebec Act, supra note 52, s. 26.
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Challenging Compliance
Individuals should be allowed to directly appeal or enforce the decision
of an organization if he or she challenges the organization's compliance.
The organization should be required to respond within a specific period
of time (e.g. 30 days). 224 The cost of a challenge (including investigation
and adjudication) should be borne either by the organization or the Office
of the Privacy Commissioner, and advocacy services should be provided
to individuals free of charge. Investigation should be conducted by the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner.
The Act represented an opportunity for the government to affirmatively
address Canadian citizens' concerns about the protection of their privacy.
However, by viewing privacy protection principally through the lenses of
the market and data, the Act ultimately better serves the interests of the
market than those of human rights. Invasions of privacy by new and
established technologies are neither necessary nor inevitable. Broad,
democratic policy-making can ensure that citizens construct and guide
the society in which they live by controlling the technologies that are used
and developed. In order to do so, however, citizens must voice their
concerns and governments must listen and effectively respond to ensure
that the human rights aspects of privacy protection are substantively
addressed, either through amendments to the Act or through the enactment
of a Charter of Privacy Rights.
Appendix A
The Privacy Charter is as follows:
1.1 Everyone is entitled to expect and enjoy:
" Physical, bodily and psychological integrity and privacy;
" Privacy of personal information;
" Freedom from surveillance;
" Privacy of personal communications; and
* Privacy of personal space;
1.2 Everyone is guaranteed that:
" These privacy rights will be respected by others adopting
whatever protective measures are most appropriate to do so;
and
* Violations of these privacy rights, unless justifiable according
to the exceptions principle which follows, will be subject to
proper redress;
224. Ibid., s. 32.
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2. Justification for Exceptions
Exceptions, allowing the rights and guarantees set out above to be
infringed, will only be allowed if the interference with these rights
and guarantees are reasonable and can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society
3.1 The basic duties owed to others to ensure their privacy rights are
adequately respected include:
* The duty to secure meaningful consent;
* The duty to take all steps necessary to adequately respect
others' privacy rights or, if their rights must be infringed, to
interfere with privacy as little as possible;
" The duty to be accountable;
" The duty to be transparent;
" The duty to use and provide access to privacy enhancing
technologies; and
" The duty to build privacy protection features into technological
designs.
4.1 Specific rights related to personal information
* Everyone is the rightful owner of their personal information,
no matter where it is held, and this fight is inalienable.
* Everyone is entitled to respect and enjoy anonymity, unless the
need to identify individuals is reasonably justified.
5.1 The basic duties owed to others to ensure their informational
privacy rights are adequately respected include, in addition to the
general obligations set out above:
" The duty to hold sensitive personal information in trust;
" The duty to limit information collection to what is necessary
and justifiable under the circumstances;
" The duty to identify the purpose for which personal informa
tion is collected;
" The duty to ensure the information collected is correct and of
the highest quality;
" The duty to provide the people whose personal data is collected
with access to that information and a means to review and, if
necessary, to correct it;
" The duty to only use and disclose personal information for the
purposes identified when meaningful consent was obtained;
* The duty to keep personal information only for as long as is
necessary and justifiable;
" The duty not to disadvantage people because they elect to
exercise their rights to privacy.
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Appendix B
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY CHARTER
25
Preamble
THE MEANING OF 'PRIVACY'
Australians value privacy. They expect that their rights to privacy be
recognised and protected.
People have a right to the privacy of their own body, private space,
privacy of communications, information privacy (rights concerning
information about a person), and freedom from surveillance.
'Privacy' is widely used to refer to a group of related rights which are
accepted nationally and internationally. This Charter calls these rights
'privacy principles'.
Privacy Principles comprise both the rights that each person is entitled
to expect and protect, and the obligations of organisations and others to
respect those rights.
Personal information is information about an identified person, no
matter how it is stored (eg sound, image, data, fingerprints).
PRIVACY IS IMPORTANT
A free and democratic society requires respect for the autonomy of
individuals, and limits on the power of both state and private organisations
to intrude on that autonomy.
Privacy is a value which underpins human dignity and other key values
such as freedom of association and freedom of speech.
Even those privacy protections and limitations on surveillance that do
exist are being progressively undermined by technological and
administrative changes. New forms of protection are therefore required.
INTERFERENCES WITH PRIVACY MUST BE JUSTIFIED
Privacy is a basic human right and the reasonable expectation of every
person. It should not be assumed that a desire for privacy means that a
person has 'something to hide'. People who wish to protect their privacy
should not be required to justify their desire to do so.
The maintenance of other social interests (public and private) justifies
some interferences with privacy and exceptions to these Principles. The
onus is on those who wish to interfere with privacy to justify doing so. The
Charter does not attempt to specify where this may occur.
225. © Australian Privacy Charter Council, 1994, online: <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/
Roger.Clarke/DV/PrivacyCharter.html> (date accessed: 23 March 2000).
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AIM OF THE PRINCIPLES
The following Privacy Principles are a general statement of the privacy
protection that Australians should expect to see observed by both the
public and private sectors. They are intended to act as a benchmark
against which the practices of business and government, and the adequacy
of legislation and codes, may be measured. They inform Australians of
the privacy rights that they are entitled to expect, and should observe.
The Privacy Charter does not attempt to specify the appropriate means
of ensuring implementation and observance of the Privacy Principles. It
does require that their observance be supported by appropriate means,
and that appropriate redress be provided for breaches.
Privacy Principles
1. JUSTIFICATION & EXCEPTIONS
Technologies, administrative systems, commercial services or individual
activities with potential to interfere with privacy should not be used or
introduced unless the public interest in so doing outweighs any consequent
dangers to privacy.
Exceptions to the Principles should be clearly stated, made in accordance
with law, proportional to the necessities giving rise to the exception, and
compatible with the requirements of a democratic society.
2. CONSENT
Individual consent justifies exceptions to some Privacy Principles.
However, 'consent' is meaningless if people are not given full information
or have no option but to consent in order to obtain a benefit or service.
People have the right to withdraw their consent.
In exceptional situations the use or establishment of a technology or
personal data system may be against the public interest even if it is with
the consent of the individuals concerned.
3. ACCOUNTABILITY
An organisation is accountable for its compliance with these Principles.
An identifiable person should be responsible for ensuring that the
organisation complies with each Principle.
4. OBSERVANCE
Each Principle should be supported by necessary and sufficient measures
(legal, administrative or commercial) to ensure its full observance, and to
provide adequate redress for any interferences with privacy resulting
from its breach.
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5. OPENNESS
There should be a policy of openness about the existence and operation
of technologies, administrative systems, services or activities with potential
to interfere with privacy.
Openness is needed to facilitate public participation in assessing
justifications for technologies, systems or services; to identify purposes
of collection; to facilitate access and correction by the individual concerned;
and to assist in ensuring the Principles are observed.
6. FREEDOM FROM SURVEILLANCE
People have a right to conduct their affairs free from surveillance or fear
of surveillance. 'Surveillance' means the systematic observation or
recording of one or more people's behaviour, communications, or personal
information.
7. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
People who wish to communicate privately, by whatever means, are
entitled to respect for privacy, even when communicating in otherwise
public places.
8. PRIVATE SPACE
People have a right to private space in which to conduct their personal
affairs. This right applies not only in a person's home, but also, to varying
degrees, in the workplace, the use of recreational facilities and public
places.
9. PHYSICAL PRIVACY
Interferences with a person's privacy such as searches of a person,
monitoring of a person's characteristics or behaviour through bodily
samples, physical or psychological measurement, are repugnant and
require a very high degree of justification.
10. ANONYMOUS TRANSACTIONS
People should have the option of not identifying themselves when
entering transactions.
11. COLLECTION LIMITATION
The minimum amount of personal information should be collected, by
lawful and fair means, and for a lawful and precise purpose specified at
the time of collection. Collection should not be surreptitious. Collection
should be from the person concerned, if practicable.
At the time of collection, personal information should be relevant to
the purpose of collection, accurate, complete and up-to-date.
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12. INFORMATION QUALITY
Personal information should be relevant to each purpose for which it is
used or disclosed, and should be accurate, complete and up-to-date at that
time.
13. ACCESS & CORRECTION
People should have aright to access personal information about themselves,
and to obtain corrections to ensure its information quality.
Organisations should take reasonable measures to make people aware
of the existence of personal information held about them, the purposes for
which it is held, any legal authority under which it is held, and how it can
be accessed and corrected.
14. SECURITY
Personal information should be protected by security safeguards
commensurate with its sensitivity, and adequate to ensure compliance
with these Principles.
15. USE & DISCLOSURE LIMITATIONS
Personal information should only be used, or disclosed, for the purposes
specified at the time of collection, except if used or disclosed for other
purposes authorised by law or with the meaningful consent of the person
concerned.
16. RETENTION LIMITATION
Personal information should be kept no longer than is necessary for its
lawful uses, and should then be destroyed or made anonymous.
17. PUBLIC REGISTERS
Where personal information is collected under legislation and public
access is allowed, these Principles still apply except to the extent required
for the purpose for which public access is allowed.
18. NO DISADVANTAGE
People should not have to pay in order to exercise their rights of privacy
described in this Charter (subject to any justifiable exceptions), nor be
denied goods or services or offered them on a less preferential basis. The
provision of reasonable facilities for the exercise of privacy rights should
be a normal operating cost.
